Comments on Contestability by Jacobs, Jack B.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 54 Number 4 Article 9 
7-1-2000 
Comments on Contestability 
Jack B. Jacobs 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jack B. Jacobs, Comments on Contestability, 54 U. Miami L. Rev. 847 (2000) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol54/iss4/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 





To be asked to comment on a paper by this remarkable attorney and
member of the Harvard Law School faculty is as daunting as it is an
honor. Like most judges, I am not trained in econometrics and, in this
highly specialized arena, have little to contribute to the substance of Pro-
fessor Coates's paper, with whose conclusions I have no reason to disa-
gree. What I, therefore, will do is share some modest reflections about
broader issues implicated by that paper from the judicial perspective -
a vantage point concededly more intuitive and anecdotal than scientific.
I agree with Professor Coates that his critique of the "scientific evi-
dence" on takeover defenses inevitably raises (in his words) "meta"
questions' about the social sciences more generally and (from my per-
spective) the proper role of "scientific" empiric research in the adjudica-
tion process.
Professor Coates's thesis starts with the "fact" that the academic
view, particularly after the Delaware Supreme Court validated the
poison pill takeover defense in Moran v. Household International, Inc.,2
was that the adoption by firms of the pill, alone or in combination with
other antitakeover defenses, will reduce firm value. That view, which I
will refer to as "conventional wisdoms," stemmed from the concern that
the pill would give target company boards, particularly boards that were
entrenchment-motivated, carte blanche to obstruct value-creating hostile
acquisition bids. From that premise, there developed the hypothesis that
the market would react adversely to pill adoptions by lowering the
adopting firm's stock market price.
This hypothesis became the subject of empirical research ("event
studies") that attempted to test it by measuring the impact of pill adop-
tion upon the adopting firm's stock market price. That empirical
research is the subject of Professor Coates's Contestability paper, which
extensively surveys the prior studies and concludes that their results are
wrong, or at least not supported by the evidence, because they suffer
1. John C. Coates IV, The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of the Scientific
Evidence on Takeover Defenses, 54 U. MiAMi L. REv. - (2000) [hereinafter Contestability].
This paper was the subject of a panel discussion at the Institute on Mergers and Acquisitions
sponsored by the University of Miami Law School, held on February 12, 2000.
2. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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from design flaws. Professor Coates's hope is that exposing those flaws
will improve future research on takeover defenses.
Neither I nor, I submit, the mergers and acquisitions practicing bar,
should have reason to quarrel with Professor Coates's conclusions,
because they are consistent with our own post-Moran experience. Fif-
teen years later, with the insight that only hindsight can provide, we now
know that in most contested takeovers, target company boards have
deployed the pill beneficently to achieve significant "control" premia -
to increase firm value - for their shareholders. Similar results have
been achieved in friendly acquisitions of firms that have adopted pills.
Given this nonscientific, anecdotal view of the effect of the pill,
grounded upon fifteen years of evolved takeover jurisprudence and
mergers and acquisitions experience, one would expect that the empiric
studies based on target firm market prices would at first confirm the
conventional wisdom beginning in 1985, and then, over the next ten
years, increasingly reflect the opposite view because of the market's
changing (i.e., positive) perception of the pill and its potential for
increasing at target company's value. To the extent Professor Coates's
paper does not validate this expectation - because it concludes that the
empiric studies' conventional wisdom conclusions are not adequately
supported - it comes as a surprise. One explanation may be that the
market always knew that the conventional wisdom about pills was
wrong. Another may be that the methodologies used in the event studies
were flawed. Professor Coates appears to embrace the latter
explanation.
These observations, informed by Professor Coates's study, prompt
a few "meta" questions that we judges and practitioners who deal with
mergers and acquisitions issues should seriously ponder. Those ques-
tions ultimately raise concerns about whether the factual perceptions of
the effects of takeover defensive measures are accurate, or, to put it
more formalistically, about the soundness of the factual and perceptual
foundation upon which current mergers and acquisitions jurisprudence is
based.
II. SOME "META" QUESTIONS
The ultimate question lurking in the Contestability study is an old
one presented in a new context: to what extent can "science" or the
"scientific method" be validly employed to predict and understand
human behavior and social arrangements? Can "facts" derived from sci-
entific methods improve the development, whether by judges or legisla-
tors, of rules governing human behavior by more accurately reflecting
reality and furthering the policies that underlie those rules?
[Vol. 54:847
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Ever since the late-nineteenth century scholars and social reformers
have sought to affix the label "science" to fields of scholarly endeavor
that are essentially humanistic and nonquantitative, e.g., political science
and social science. Classical science involves precisely accurate mea-
surement and prediction. This accuracy is possible because the units of
scientific measurement (a second, a minute, an erg, an ohm, a meter, a
liter or an ounce) are the subjects of universally accepted conventions,
and also because, in most cases, the models employed by science can be
defined and expressed in mathematical terms. The field of human
behavior, whether of individuals or entire societies, however, has by and
large, not successfully lent itself to such precise models or to universally
accepted and precise units of measurement. That is not due to lack of
effort. Rather, it is either because the human condition does not lend
itself to conventional scientific methods or because the current state of
our science is too primitive to measure and predict phenomena as com-
plex as human and social behavior.
I say this not to diminish Professor Coates's paper but, rather, to
create a broader context into which his scholarship fits and contributes.
The context is the discipline of law which unites all of us professionally.
Even that value-oriented discipline has been the object of efforts to
employ methods claimed to be "scientific." During the latter part of the
nineteenth century, Christopher Langdell viewed the case study method
as a "scientific" way to abstract general rules of law from highly particu-
larized "data," namely, judicial decisions. Langdell's ambition and
vision drove the development of the Socratic method, but that approach,
despite Langdell's claims, was not scientific except to the extent it
required rigorous and careful inductive and deductive reasoning. During
the twentieth century, the emergence of other counter-scientific legal
movements, especially legal realism and critical legal studies, conveyed
quite different views of the nature of law. Critical legal studies, in partic-
ular - premised on the view that "law is politics" - fell on the oppo-
site end of the spectrum. One outcome of these movements was a wide
recognition that law is no more "scientific," in the classical sense, than
social science or political science.
Although efforts to disconnect law and science persist, they have
not banished science from the field, but only relocated its sphere of
influence in that field. Rather than being a model or analytical frame-
work for "discovering" or "developing" legal rules, science is currently
used in a more limited, yet more realistic and helpful way: to determine
more accurately social "facts" to serve as a basis for legal rules and for
the social policies underlying those rules. The Contestability paper is a
prime example of this use of science. Professor Coates does not deploy
20001
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science as a framework to deduce rules of law that govern the adoption
and deployment of poison pills. Rather, he and other scholars invoke
science to validate the accuracy of the perceived and disputed effects of
the pill - specifically, whether the pill enhances, reduces, or has no
effect upon, firm value. Ideally, and depending on the answer, the legal
rule might (or should) change as an indirect consequence. By way of
example, if it could be accurately determined by a proper application of
the scientific method that pills reduce firm value, then, arguably, legal
rules should be developed that would deter the adoption and use of pills.
Conversely, if pills enhance firm value, legal rules should be developed
that encourage, or at least not discourage, their use.
The potential benefits to courts of this use of the scientific method
are readily apparent, at least to me. To make the point, I mention two
takeover defense cases over which I recently presided.
In Carmody v. Toll Brothers,3 I confronted the question of whether
a dead hand poison pill4 was properly a subject of legal attack on the
basis that, in addition to violating Delaware's corporate statute, that
form of pill was coercive or preclusive under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Peteroleum Co.5 and that it constituted an intentional interference by
target company directors with the shareholder franchise under Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.6 In Toll Brothers both questions were
answered in the affirmative, but that ruling was completely theoretical,
since it was made on a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss.7 That is, the
motion was denied because it was possible that, in some future case, the
dead hand pill might conceivably prove to be coercive, preclusive, and/
or obstructive to a meaningful exercise of the shareholder franchise. The
true test of those hypothetical possibilities would have to await a real
case in which the pill was actually being deployed.
That case arose only three months later in Mentor Graphics v.
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. There, the Unocal and Blasius issues
were found to be too fact-laden and uncertain to be resolved on a motion
for summary judgment. Accordingly, it became necessary to hold a
trial, which involved expert testimony about the likely deterrent effect of
3. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).
4. A "dead hand" poison pill is one that can be redeemed only by a majority of the directors
in office at the time the pill is adopted. The purpose and effect of a dead hand pill is to discourage
a hostile bidder from waging a proxy contest to remove the incumbent board, since the bidders'
director-nominees would be unable to redeem the pill.
5. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
6. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
7. See Toll Brothers, 723 A.2d at 1182.
8. 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff'd sub.nom., Quicktum Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro,
721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
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a no hand (delayed redemption) poison pill9 upon the target company's
public shareholders' reaction to a hostile takeover bid that offered a
modest premium. How useful it would have been if that cause and
effect relationship - the deterrent force of the pill - could be deter-
mined with scientific, incontestable accuracy, thereby avoiding the
uncertainties of conventional fact-finding in a specialized field where
most judges have no specific expertise. If such scientific knowledge
were reliable and readily available, it would influence how new kinds of
takeover defenses could be shaped, and would better enable their cre-
ators to predict to target company clients how those defenses would fare
under the applicable system of legal rules. If the answers to such per-
plexing question could be determined scientifically, it should be inap-
propriate for those answers to be determined by the vagaries of the
adjudication process that rests upon fortuities such as witness credibility.
An eternal verity is an eternal verity regardless of the courtroom
demeanor of the witness who utters it. A "counter scientific" finding of
fact based on human perceptions should have no more validity because
it is made by a court than should an edict of the church about the shape
of the solar system during the time of Galileo.
But the foregoing is all prologue to a basic "meta" question: is
there a reliable scientific method by which such cause and effect rela-
tionships can be measured? Although Professor Coates faults the meth-
odologies used in the prior studies as flawed in their design, he does not,
at least in his Contestability paper, propose a methodology to avoid
those flaws. One can only hope that he is in the process of crafting that
methodology and will report its successful use in a future article. In the
meantime, the academic debate should center on whether it is possible to
design a metric whose accuracy will be universally acknowledged.
If such a metric can be created, the next question is, by what pro-
cess can it rapidly achieve judicial acceptance? Must there be a test
case, employing methodologies such as those prescribed in Daubert v.
Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1" where a non-scientist judge must
determine, in an arena involving conflicting expert testimony, whether
the new methodology is scientifically sound and generally accepted in
that professional community? Alternatively, would it be possible to
develop a scientific "certifying" board whose imprimatur would be
9. The dead hand poison pill in Mentor Graphics prohibited any board of directors - the
incumbents or a new board elected by a proxy contest mounted by a hostile bidder - from
redeeming the pill for six months after a change of control.
10. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (holding that the trial court has a special obligation to "ensure
that any and all scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but [also] reliable."); see also, Kumho
Tire Co., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d
513, 521 (Del. 1999).
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regarded as so definitive that its mere placement would entitle the new
methodology to judicial acceptance?
A related question to ponder is: at what point will the new method-
ology generate results fit to be a subject of judicial notice? The present
state of the law of judicial notice makes it unlikely that that will happen
at any time soon. But, if a scientifically reliable method of assessing the
impact of antitakeover defenses (or, for that matter, any social phenome-
non) can be developed, should there not be a doctrine of judicial notice
that enables courts, in specific cases, to access studies employing that
methodology without undergoing the costs and hazards of a live trial?
Being a non-academic, I have the luxury of asking these questions
without having to struggle to develop answers. My point is that Profes-
sor Coates's paper is a noble endeavor that, if successful, could
represent an important step in reaching a goal about which social scien-
tists have long dreamed but have yet to achieve. If science can be
deployed, accurately and reliably, to measure the effects of social or
economic arrangements upon human behavior, our profession stands to
benefit greatly.
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